SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS
Vic. Umm Hajul Airfield, Iraq
26-27 FEB 91
Captain B. H. Friesen
Commander, I Troop, 3/3 ACR
1. Receive verbal operations order from LTC Daly at appx. 2015 hours 26 FEB 91 in TAA CLAW (grid PU0762). OPORD states the following:
a. Regiment will attack an airfield at grid PU447520.
b. First and Second Squadrons will fix the enemy while Third Squadron assaults. 3-18 FA Bn. provides an 8 minute prep fire with 288 rounds DPICM on objective prior to our LD.
c. Squadron diamond formation: M Co. at point, K Trp. on left, I Trp. on right, command group in center, and L Trp. in reserve. M Co. in wedge. K and I Trps. echeloned left and right respectively.
d. Dug-in battalion of Iraqi infantry at airfield. "Expect stiff resistance and surface laid mines."
e. Forward line of friendly elements is 37 north-south grid line (7km west of airfield). No mention of friendly units forward of that line.
f. No reference to boundaries of any type. Eastern limit of advance is 58 north-south grid line.
g. Scouts will disarm EPWs and herd them to central location.
h. Only rear black-out drive lit. Nine volt infrared lights on right and left most vehicles in each troop. (Lights issued at OPORD)
i. Checkpoints for squadron movement are as follows:
CP A PU170550
CP B PU290550
PL JOAN PU390550
CP C PU450550
CP D PU462552
CP E PU467484
CP F PU470430 (southern limit of advance)
j. Deployment time from TAA CLAW is 2100 hours.
k. Probably follow-on mission to attack second airfield vic. PU755600
2. Movement to Umm Hajul Airfield.
a. Begins appx. 2130 hours.
b. Night is overcast and we experience a torrential downpour for almost one hour. Visibility poor and movement is very slow.
c. Momentary halt as 3-18 FA fires DPICM prep. Cross LD after prep fire ceases.
d. M Co. drifting to the left (north). LTC Daly directs them to correct the drift, but this does not occur. M Co. approximately 4 km too far north as we approach airfield (verified by my Global Positioning System).
e. My far right element (1st Platoon [scouts]) makes contact with airfield to its front.
3. Assault on Umm Hajul Airfield.
a. I notify LTC Daly of airfield location and request permission to enter its perimeter. Permission granted.
b. I direct 2nd Platoon (tank) to break through the perimeter fence and secure the tower/hangar complex. 1st Platoon (scouts) supports 2nd Platoon's move. Both platoons secure the complex without incident.
c. I position my tank to cover the troop's exposed flank (southeast) until 3rd Platoon (scout) can assume that sector. My gunner observes two figures heading southwest at approximately 1,000 meters.
d. I report this to my troop TOC. My XO (1LT McClain) relays the information over the squadron command net. I move my tank forward slowly to maintain contact, and direct 3rd Platoon to send a section forward to my location immediately and follow with the rest of the platoon. I direct 4th Platoon (tank) to support 3rd Platoon. I direct 1st and 2nd Platoons to remain in place at the tower complex
e. My vehicle moves southeast approximately 1,000 meters and halts when two dismounted soldiers enter what appears to be a building. A Bradley section (I35 and I36) joins me a minute later.
f. I observe 3 figures loitering around the structure. They are clearly visible in my thermal sights and are not wearing helmets or LBE. They do not appear to be aware of our presence. I send this report to my troop TOC for relay higher.
g. Due to intelligence reports and appearance of the soldiers, I believe them to be a forward Iraqi observation post. They are in a depression and I cannot determine if anti-tank weapons are present. Request permission from LTC Daly to fire a warning shot 45 degrees to the north of the suspected enemy position. Permission granted.
h. My tank fires a 20 round burst of 7.62mm coaxial machine gun to the left of the position. The soldiers take cover immediately and there is a pause for almost one minute. "They're shooting at us" comes across the troop net. Through my thermal sight, I see small arms fire emanating from the vicinity of the structure, arcing high over the Bradley section.
i. I direct the Bradley section to return fire and also fire upon the position with my tank's coax. I35 fires 27 rounds of 25mm high explosive in a Z pattern into the position. I36 fires coax and then switches to 25mm HE when the coax experiences a stoppage, engaging the structure. My tank fires approximately 50 rounds of coax at the position. Our opponents do not fire at us again, so I command "cease fire" over the troop net and direct each platoon to acknowledge. All acknowledge. I then relay what transpired to LTC Daly through my TOC. My XO relays the cease fire to the command group.
j. One soldier of the opposing force seems to have been wounded in the leg. None have been killed. The structure is beginning to burn. There has been no sign of any other activity in the sector, so I decide to hold fire until I can bring my 3rd and 4th Platoons forward to my left. I direct the troop to hold their fire unless they are directly engaged or see our opponents employ anti-tank weapons.
k. Confusion breaks out 1,000 meters to my rear as the command group (3 Bradleys, 1 German-built Fox, and 1 Humvee) enters my perimeter unannounced on the left, rear flank. 4th Platoon believes the Fox to be an Iraqi BTR-60 and narrowly averts engaging it, due to the keen eyesight of the platoon sergeant (SFC Martin). The platoon sergeant announces the presence of the command group over the troop net, and the momentary crisis passes. Several American lives were almost lost due to this unannounced arrival.
l. The command group positions itself to the left of my vehicle, amongst the positions I directed 3rd Platoon to occupy. LTC Daly directs me to switch my radio to the squadron net. I relay through my XO that I cannot do so because I will no longer be in control of my unit. (The troop commander's tank, by design, has only one transmitter and two receivers. He can listen to both squadron and troop nets, but transmit only on the troop net. The troop XO managers communication higher and laterally. This doctrinal concept ensures that the troop commander can concentrate upon controlling his unit.) LTC Daly again insists that I switch to the squadron net and I again direct my XO to inform him that this is impossible. I cannot lose control of the troop in event firing erupts again.
m. The structure now burns fiercely and begins to explode every few seconds. LTC Daly orders me to dismount the 3rd Platoon scouts to "sweep the objective." I direct my XO to inform him that I advise against it because twelve dismounted soldiers are not sufficient force against an unknown defensive position with at least six soldiers in it. I am still looking for the Iraqi battalion I had been told to expect on the objective. Scouts are not dismounted infantry and are not numerically sufficient to serve as such during an assault. The exploding structure adds further danger to dismounted troops. I direct the XO to tell LTC Daly that I recommend developing the situation further before dismounting scouts. I feel that if the force before us is all that exists in the area, then they will surrender when they realize the size of the force they are confronting. I direct my troop to remain mounted and reiterate that they should hold their fire.
n. The psyops Humvee from command group moves forward and begins broadcasting a message in Arabic. The soldiers opposing us begin to withdraw. One of the soldiers appears to be helping the wounded individual withdraw. LTC Daly's voice comes over the squadron net with, "They're getting away! They're getting away!" A burst of machine gun fire erupts from my left and strikes the soldier helping his wounded comrade. He falls to the ground and does not move again. The previously wounded soldier crawls into a slight depression. I am furious and direct my platoon leaders to check their units to see who fired the shots. Each platoon reports negative. My 3rd Platoon Leader informs me that HQ66 from the command group fired the burst.
o. Through my thermal sight, I suddenly see two figures approach I35 and I36 from the left. I believe them to be enemy soldiers, because I have directed all my scouts to remain in their vehicles. My gunner switches the sight to 10 power and places the reticle on one of the figures. I can barely see the outline of a Kevlar helmet. I direct my gunner to leave the weapon on safe and announce over the troop net that we have two friendly dismounts on the ground to the rear of the Bradleys. I direct both scout platoon leaders to check if any of their vehicles have dismounted troops. Both report negative. I tell them to check again. The two dismounts are now at the rear of I35 and the vehicle commander reports over the troop net that they are from LTC Daly's vehicle. We have narrowly averted the loss of friendly lives again.
p. One of the opposing troops launches a green star cluster. This is the theater recognition signal for friendly forces. The Iraqis have the same star clusters also, so I am unsure of its meaning. I reiterate the hold fire command over the troop net. One of the troop's scouts sees Humvee near the position and reports it over the troop net. I take it to be the psyops vehicle and direct him to get an exact location for it.
q. One of the opposing soldiers approaches I35 and I36, waving his arms over his head. I direct the Bradleys not to shoot at him. SSG Baez (I36) challenges the figure, who answers in English. Baez reports over the troop net that there are friendly forces on the objective. We believe them to be liberated American prisoners. I direct I35 and I36 to dismount their scouts and bring in the Americans and prisoners.
r. One of the dismounts from LTC Daly's vehicle (a sergeant) approaches SSG Ruch (I35) and tells him there are six Iraqi prisoners on the position. The other dismount (an LNO captain from the 82nd Airborne) quickly states that they are six Americans. The sergeant repeats that they are Iraqis. The LNO captain tells SSG Ruch, "Don't listen to him. That's what he was told to say."
s. I35 and I36 scouts and Bradley Commanders (six soldiers total) move into the position and find only American troops. They begin to administer first aid to the wounded soldiers and find one to be dead. They discover that the structure is an M548 ammunition carrier, and that the soldiers are engineers from the 1st Armored Division. SSG Ruch reports this over the troop net. A wave of anguish passes over the troop.
t. Fifteen minutes after the I Troop scouts enter the position, the M548 explodes violently. Shrapnel covers an area of several hundred meters. Miraculously, nobody is seriously injured. My XO moves the troop command post forward and begins to direct the medevac operation.
u. The remainder of the squadron meanwhile has been without direction for several hours.
v. The mood within the troop is ugly. The soldiers are angry because we were ordered to attack an area occupied by friendly forces. We feel betrayed and ashamed. Several threats against LTC Daly come across the troop net and I must intervene to restore order. Numerous troopers of all ranks repeatedly ask me who ordered the attack and where the intelligence reports came from. I can give them no answer.
EVENTS AFTER ASSAULT ON UMM HAJUL
1. Systematic elimination of witnesses and outspoken soldiers.
a. I Troop Commander (CPT Friesen) [WITNESS] given worst OER in regiment, although his troop led the squadron throughout Operations Desert Shield and Storm. CPT Friesen's selection for graduate school and Defense Language Institute were cancelled. LTC Daly told him not to appeal the OER and leave gracefully. He said that "these things sometimes happen for the good of the army." Friesen was never counseled for sub-standard performance during his entire time as a troop commander. Both the Squadron S-3 (MAJ Martin) and LTC Daly told him in December that they were counting on I Troop to lead the way.
b. I Troop Executive Officer (1LT McClain) [WITNESS] resigned his commission. LTC Daly remarked on McClain's OER that he was the best XO in the squadron, then gave him a sub-standard block rating. LTC Daly told McClain that he was giving him the lower block rating because he needed to adjust his rating profile.
c. K Troop Commander (CPT Cortes) [OUTSPOKEN] given a sub-standard OER although he was recognized throughout the squadron as being a very competent leader with and excellent unit. He led the squadron in any instance I Troop was unable to do so. LTC Daly also told him not to appeal the OER or make an issue of it. CPT Cortes also resigned his commission.
d. The 4th Platoon Leader (1LT XXXXXX) [WITNESS] and his platoon sergeant (SFC XXXXXXX) [WITNESS] were both pending disciplinary action because a 120mm live tank round was found in a 4th Platoon tank two months after its return from the Middle East (after CPT Friesen left command). CPT Friesen had personally checked all tanks before they were turned over to port crews in Jubail, Saudi Arabia. There was no ammunition of any type aboard any tanks. The 120mm round was planted aboard the tank for unknown reasons. CPT Friesen reported this to LTC Daly and the issue has since died down, but has not been resolved yet. Is this a conspiracy?
e. K Troop First Sergeant (1SG XXXXXXXX) [OUTSPOKEN] was relieved by LTC Daly the day after CPT Cortes left command. The relief was not backed up by proper documentation and was not in accordance with proper procedure for relief. Paperwork was fabricated after the fact to document this relief.
f. I Troop Master Gunner / Operations Sergeant(SGT Eubank) [WITNESS] left the Army immediately upon return from the Middle East due to disgust with the squadron leadership. He was a brilliant tactician and an outstanding leader.
2. Conversely, the L Troop Commander (CPT XXXXX) received one of the highest ratings in the regiment. He was the reserve element throughout the entire period in the Middle East. On several occasions, LTC Daly took his two scout platoons from him and put them under the operational control of the S-4. CPT XXXXX himself got lost on several occasions for several hours during combat operations, leaving his troops without leadership. Is this equity?
3. The perception among the junior officers and soldiers in the squadron is that some type of cover up has been implemented by either LTC Daly or COL Starr, or perhaps both, to ensure their careers remain on track, no matter what the cost. They believe that LTC Daly was interested only in covering himself with glory and medals, even at the expense of lives.
4. Several burning questions remain in the minds of the soldiers who fought for the Squadron in this conflict.
WHO GAVE THE ORDERS TO ATTACK THE AIRFIELD?
WHERE DID THE INTELLIGENCE REPORT ORIGINATE OF AN IRAQI BATTALION OCCUPYING THE AIRFIELD?
DID THE SQUARDON AND REGIMENTAL LEADERSHIP KNOW ABOUT FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE AREA?
WHY WERE THE SQUADRON'S MOST CAPABLE JUNIOR LEADERS' CAREERS DESTROYED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS INCIDENT.
Mistrust of the higher leadership and dissatisfaction with the Army will continue until these questions are answered. The soldiers deserve to know.