Captain B. H. Friesen
4321 Fictitious Street
El Paso, Texas 79925
21 June 1992
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, FORCES COMMAND, FORT MCPHERSON, GEORGIA 30330-6000
SUBJECT: Statement Pertaining to Letter of Reprimand
1. Reference Letter of Reprimand for Captain B. H. Friesen from Commander, Forces Command, dated 14 April 1992, received 29 May 1992.
2. I strongly protest my receipt of a reprimand for alleged negligence on 27 February 1991 contributing to the fratricide death of Corporal Douglas Fielder. I request that it be revoked.
3. Negligence is defined as "failure to use a reasonable amount of care when such failure results in injury or damage to another." I was not negligent at any time before, during, or after the attack on the airfield. I and my unit acted responsibly and with care in all instances.
4. In light of the information provided to me by my superiors, I acted with extreme caution. My squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel John Daly, neglected to inform me of the location of the corps boundary. He also told me that we would be the most forward friendly unit in the area and that the airfield we were attacking was defended by a dug in battalion of Iraqi soldiers. He made no mention of possible friendly forces in the area, or that the VII Corps was already 12 hours ahead of us. He stated that our objective was seven kilometers past the forward line of friendly forces. This clearly indicated to me that we would not encounter friendly forces at any time during the operation.
5. LTC Daly directed the use of a diamond assault formation to clear the airfield. This formation placed maximum tank firepower forware, with lighter scout vehicles securing the flanks. This formation had no reconnaissance force whatsoever to the front. Its sole purpose was to destroy confirmed enemy positions. Why did LTC Daly use this formation if he knew we were operating near a corps boundary with the possibility of friendly forces in the area? He sent his squadron on a blind attack into an area where he was uncertain of the situation. Scout platoons should have preceded the squadron into the area. Failure to do so was a violation of basic tactical principles. Use of this formation confirmed in my mind that we would encounter heavy resistance by Iraqi forces on the airfield.
6. My actions on the airfield itself were carefully thought out and correct in every respect. I did not engage until after LTC Daly had granted permission for me to do so. I then fired only warning shots, well away from the group of soldiers. Upon receiving returned small arms fire, I and two other vehicles from my troop briefly suppressed our opponents. We did not kill any soldiers from the engineer unit. LTC Daly himself fired the fatal shots after I had called a cease fire several times over the troop radio net. My executive officer relayed this command over the squadron radio net on each occasion. LTC Daly himself made several statements during the 15-6 investigation confirming that I gave this command.
7. Although our thermal imaging systems presented a clear picture, they could not differentiate colors. This made it impossible to recognize coalition markings on the engineer vehicles. The U.S. Central Command Anti-Fratricide SOP (dated December 1990) provided night recognition signals. Unfortunately, this SOP was never available at our level throughout the entire war. We never even knew of its existence. Why did Central Command officials not make sure that combat units actually received this important document, instead of just providing lip service to its existence? I and my unit were not able to adhere to a document we had never seen.
8. My troop was not an independent unit, but part of the right flank of the assault formation. We were under LTC Daly's direct control at all times. Why did LTC Daly give me permission to fire warning shots when he knew that we were directly on the VII Corps boundary? His doing so only added further credence to my belief that we were facing Iraqis. He had a functioning global positioning system and was acutely aware of our location. Had I been informed of the the boundary location, I would have seen on my positioning system that I was close to it and forbidden any shooting.
9. I ordered a cease fire because I believed that we had expended the maximum amount of necessary force. The soldiers, who we still believed to be Iraqis, no longer posed a threat. It was my intention to wait for their surrender. We had much heavier weapons at our disposal and could have destroyed the small group of soldiers in a matter of seconds. Our restraint and clear thinking prevented this. If LTC Daly had not disregarded and overridden my cease fire, Corporal Fielder would still be alive today. Fielder was assisting a fellow soldier to a safer location when LTC Daly shot him. I could see clearly in my thermal sight that neither soldier carried weapons and thus posed no threat. The soldiers also had no place to escape. Our vehicles surrounded them on flat terrain and could easily have outdistanced them. Shooting them was totally unjustified, even if they had been Iraqis.
10. If LTC Daly and COL Starr had not withheld critical information about friendly force locations and unit boundaries from officers at my level, this incident could have been avoided. Statements by both officers in the 15-6 investigation prove that they were aware of the boundary. COL Starr was acutely aware of friendly forces in the area. Why did they not share this information with their troop commanders? It would have radically changed my thought process and actions on the airfield.
11. Statements by Lieutenant General Ronald Griffith (Commander, 1st Armored Division) and Brigadier General John Hendrix (Assistant Division Commander) both clearly assert that they directed the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment to stay away from the corps boundary and airfield because there were friendly elements in the area. They also stated that the 1st Armored Division had cleared the airfield 12 hours earlier. Why were we sent to attack an airfield that had already been cleared? To this day, I still do know know from whom this attack order originated.
12. CPT Wayne Sauer, a liaison officer assigned to 3rd ACR stated in the 15-6 investigation that he coordinated with 1st Armored Division to obtain a 5 kilometer buffer zone to attack the Umm Hajul airfield. The 1st Armored Division denied this request because their 2nd Brigade trains were in the area. 1st Armored Division also stated that the airfield was already clear. CPT Sauer briefed LTC Michael Keenan (the 3rd ACR Executive Officer) on this information. LTC Keenan passed the information on to COL Starr. Why did this critical information never make it to my level? It would have had a very significant impact on my decision to fire even a warning shot. If COL Starr ordered the attack on the airfield despite the 1st Armored Division's denial, the he is as directly responsible for Corporal Fielder's death as LTC Daly. I belive this to be the case.
13. COL Starr's entire conduct of this operation was poorly thought out and, in my opinion, an effort to claim credit for capturing an airfield. Why were there no contact and/or coordination points along the corps boundary during this operation? I was the southern most troop commander, yet I received no coordination missions. This displayed extremely bad planning and disregard for even the most basic tactical principles on behalf of COL Starr and the leaders of the 1st Armored Division. If we had had been fighting a more determined foe, he would have split the corps boundary and wreaked havoc in the 1st Armored Division's rear area. As a troop commander, I had no control whatsoever over boundary coordination missions. These were decided at regimental level and higher. If COL Starr had done his job and ensured such coordination, this tragedy would not have occured.
14. Despite the fact that both COL Starr and LTC Daly were aware of the corps boundary, the 3rd Squadron's planned attack route swung south through the airfield and penetrated seven kilometers into VII Corps territory. If the squadron had carried out the attack in its entirety, it may well have destroyed a portion of the 2nd Brigade, 1st AD trains. Why did LTC Daly approve this route and disseminate it to his subordinates when he knew where the corps boundary was? Who developed this route? This person also holds a great deal of responsibility in this incident.
15. It is crystal clear that both COL Starr and LTC Daly were aware of both the corps boundary and the possibility of friendly forces in the area. Incongruously, they ordered and conducted a violent assault in into the Umm Hajul area. I feel these were criminally negligent acts. My actions did not lead to Corporal Fielder's death. On the contrary, I did everything humanly possible to prevent it. Repeated negligence and/or disregard by COL Starr, LTC Daly and possibly other officers beyond my purview of knowledge killed Lance Fielder.
16. If I am to receive this reprimand, then I believe there are many more individuals more deserving of one. Foremost among them are:
The staff officers who drew a corps boundary through the middle of an airfield that was a key objective,
The leadership of both corps for not ensuring coordination along their flanks,
The intelligence officers from whom the misinformation came about a dug in Iraqi battalion on the airfield,
The 1st Armored Division leadership for not conducting a proper flank guard operation on an exposed flank, and
The 3rd ACR leadership for not ensuring coordination along the corps boundary.
17. The 15-6 investigation findings state that "the Regimental Commander and the Squadron Commander should have placed more emphasis on the proximity of the objective to the boundary, possible friendly forces in the area, why the buffer zone was denied, and why the attack plan was changed. Had the I Troop commander been fully apprised of all the available information, this regrettable incident could have been avoided." This corroborates everything I have already said.
18. In conclusion, I maintain that I used a greater than reasonable amount of care during the operation against the airfield. My commander, LTC Daly, failed to apprise me of information critical to my mission and fired the fatal shots from his vehicle. COL Starr negligently ordered an attack into an area he knew was occupied by friendly forces. They are the negligent parties responsible for this tragedy. My unit applied a minimum amount of force at all times commensurate with the information we received. I feel thoroughly betrayed by my superiors for not having apprised me of the most basic information I needed to conduct operations. I should not pay for mistakes made by them. I trusted their instructions and they betrayed that trust. They did not ensure proper coordination and planning at their levels and I should not be held responsible for this.
19. I would greatly appreciate information about your final decision regarding this reprimand. I will be at the letterhead address throughout my terminal leave and after my release from the service.
Very Respectfully,
B. H. Friesen
Captain, Armor