(Excepts from the GAO investigation of the Umm Hajul fratricide. The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) is an independent, professional, nonpartisan agency in the legislative branch that is commonly referred to as the investigative arm of Congress.)
COLONEL STARR’S FAILURE TO EXERCISE PROPER COMMAND AND CONTOL
ESSENTIAL INFORMATION NOT DISSEMINATED TO SUBORDINATES
Colonel Starr did not disseminate essential information to subordinate commanders, specifically about the buffer zone’s denial and the existence of a 1st AD logistics line just below the 50 east/west corps boundary, one reason for the buffer’s denial.
Colonel Starr and the 3rd ACR Operations Officer [LTC Scott Feil] based the original 3rd ACR operation plan on the assumption that the 1st AD would grant a buffer zone, allowing the 3rd ACR to cross the 50 east/west corps boundary into an area controlled by the 1st AD. Colonel Starr was advised that his request for a buffer zone had been denied before the original operation plan was issued at approximately 1856 hours, February 26. Yet, he issued the plan without modification and without indicating that the initial request for the buffer zone had been denied. The 3rd ACR plan became the basis for the 3rd Squadron’s operation plan.
Further, before the original operation plan was developed, Colonel Starr and his operations officer [LTC Scott Feil] knew that a 1st AD logistics line or Major Supply Route (MSR) existed just below the 50 east/west corps boundary. This MSR had been preplotted prior to the ground war’s beginning and was clearly shown on the 3rd ACR Operations Officer’s maps and graphics. However, we found no indication that Colonel Starr accounted for the MSR in his operation plan. He also did not advise his subordinate commanders that the buffer zone had been denied because the 1st AD had logistics lines in the area, had bypassed the airfield (on its left flank) earlier in the day, and had not detected any enemy there.
The 3rd ACR operation plan was initiated at 2100 hours, as the 3rd ACR began its movement towards Objective Bill. Approximately 1 hour later, Colonel Starr’s second request for a buffer zone was denied. Colonel Starr then canceled the indirect artillery fire of all targets in the area south of the airfield and below the 50 east/west corps boundary but did not disseminate the reason for the cancellation to all subordinate commanders. According to Colonel Starr, he also canceled the direct fire onto the airfield because he knew no known enemy was present. He then proceeded with the passage of lines. (Colonel Starr stated that one reason for proceeding with the passage of lines was to give Lt. Colonel Daly the experience of leading a regimental attack because “John had not been out in front yet.”)
At approximately 0034 hours, February 27, 1991, while the 3rd Squadron was beginning to execute the passage of lines with the 1st Squadron, Colonel Starr told Lt. Colonel Daly to change the 3rd Squadron’s scheme of maneuver to attack the airfield west to east, instead of north to south. This was almost 4 hours after the operation plan had been initiated and almost 3 hours after the second request for a buffer zone had been denied.
Our investigation showed that confusion existed throughout the 1st and 3rd Squadrons as a result of the changed plan. In particular, the 1st Squadron Commander did not meet with Colonel Starr and was unaware of the reasons for the changes in the original operation plan. The 1st Squadron Commander’s radio went dead at approximately 0139 hours. At that time, Colonel Starr directed him to “cease fire,” cancel the direct fire on the airfield, and begin passing the 3rd Squadron through the 1st Squadron. According to Colonel Starr, the 1st Squadron was not to provide direct fire unless it was engaged. The 1st Squadron Commander believed his communications problem was the reason Colonel Starr had directed the passage of lines to begin.
Further, according to witnesses we interviewed who were directly and indirectly involved in the mission’s planning process, the assault onto Objective Bill took on the characteristics of an internal mission and/or a “training mission.” This is best illustrated by the fact that the 3rd ACR Executive Officer was asleep at the time of the attack. Further, Colonel Starr acknowledged that this was not a critical mission.
INCORRECT, CONFUSING INFORMATION DISSEMINATED
Colonel Starr issued the original operation plan to the 3rd ACR Squadrons with intelligence information about a second airfield 28 kilometers further to the northeast and with reference to both Objective Bill–the Al Busayyah Northeast Airfield–and Objective Joe–the Qalib Al Luhays Airfield. Further, the squadrons were advised that battalion-size units were located at the “airfield.” The 3rd Squadron misconstrued this information as describing the enemy situation at Objective Bill when the statements actually referred to the possibility of enemy battalions being at Objective Joe. Third ACR intelligence personnel and operations officers told us that they knew no known enemy was present at Objective Bill when the original operation plan was being developed. They were more concerned with Objective Joe–the Qalib Al Luhays Airfield–that was located 28 kilometers further to the northeast.
The 3rd ACR Operation Plan also described enemy resistance as “stiffening, with mines, fighting positions and local counterattacks,” although Colonel Starr had been advised by the 1st AD before the plan’s issuance that probably no enemy was present at Objective Bill. The plan’s description pertained to the overall theater of operations, not activity at or near the airfield. As a result, that information may have confused the 3rd ACR subordinate commanders regarding enemy strength at Objective Bill.
POSITIONS NOT DETERMINED AND BOUNDARY NOT SECURED AGAINST BREACHING
Although Colonel Starr told Lt. Colonel Daly on February 27, 1991, that the 50 east/west grid line was the corps boundary and not to fire south of it, Colonel Starr did not determine his position relative to the objective and allowed elements of the 3rd Squadron to cross the corps boundary.
Further, the 3rd ACR TOC radio log notes that–20 minutes after the 3rd Squadron began passing through the 1st Squadron–Colonel Starr was concerned about the “right flank” or corps boundary. Yet, he did not place a unit or vehicle to screen along the 50 east/west corps boundary to ensure that the boundary was not breached.
In addition, when elements of the 3rd Squadron detected the fenced area and spotted a tower, they believed they had located the objective. Subsequently, Colonel Starr parked on a road adjacent to the fence approximately 800 meters north of the 50 east/west corps boundary. From his position, he should have determined that the objective airstrip was located approximately 2.2 kilometers northeast of his location and that the 3rd Squadron units were breaching the corps boundary.
NOTE:
Lieutenant Colonel Scott Feil was the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment’s Operations Officer. He was responsible for developing the tactical plan that sent over 100 armored vehicles crashing into the flank of a friendly unit. As far as I know, his actions developing this plan were never questioned, nor was he ever interviewed throughout the course of the army investigations. He escaped all responsibility for his part in this debacle, was promoted to Colonel, and served several years as the commander of the 1st Armored Training Brigade in Fort Knox, Kentucky. He then became the Executive Director of the Role of American Military Power (RAMP), a program of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA). Feil collaborated on preparing the final report of the Congressional bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, which was charged with making recommendations to improve U.S. capabilities to undertake post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq. In it, he waxed eloquent about the significant efforts it would take to collect and secure all the weapons of mass destruction that would be found after the war, but also made some constructive suggestions about rebuilding a post-war Iraq. He seems to be a much better diplomat than combat tactician. Feil was also LTC Daly’s classmate at West Point.
