January 6, 1992
Honorable Michael P. Stone
Secretary of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.
Dear Secretary Stone,
The purpose of this letter is to make you aware of improper handling of a friendly fire incident that occurred during Operation Desert Storm. The senior officers involved in this incident have evaded responsibility for their actions at the expense of sacrificing their subordinates. I have a strong interest in this matter, because I am one of those sacrificed for the careers of higher ranking officers.
The incident in question occurred during the early morning hours of 27 February 1991, in the Republic of Iraq. Poor judgement or direct omissions by two field grade officers resulted in the death of Army Corporal Douglas Fielder and wounding of Sergeant James E. Napier at the hands of United States Army forces. The two field grade officers I believe are responsible for this tragedy are Colonel Douglas H. Starr and Lieutenant Colonel John H. Daly, Jr.
Colonel Starr, commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (XVIII Airborne Corps), ordered an attack upon an airfield that had already been captured by American troops twelve hours earlier. The plan of attack was such that Starr sent a squadron (approx. 1,000 soldiers and over 100 armored vehicles) attacking into the flank of a friendly unit (1st Armored Division, VII Corps). The commander of this squadron was Lieutenant Colonel Daly, who also fired the fatal shots that killed Corporal Fielder. I was a troop commander in this squadron and an eye witness to all events that transpired at the airfield. A detailed synopsis of the order for the operation and the events on the airfield is at Enclosure 1.
I have researched the incident and discovered the following information. COL Starr failed to maintain contact with the U.S. VII Corps on the regiment's right flank. The regiment's primary mission was to maintain ground contact between XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps. This mission was vital to prevent enemy forces from exploiting gaps in our lines. and also to prevent friendly units from accidentally firing upon one another. An officer working in the regimental operations center told me that the regiment lost ground contact with VII Corps on the afternoon of 26 February, and that COL Starr did not seem concerned with re-establishing that contact.
The officer I talked with also stated that COL Starr knew the airfield in question had already been captured twelve hours earlier by elements of VII Corps. He also knew that the intelligence report of an Iraqi battalion occupying the airfield was was several days old. In spite of this, he still ordered the regiment to attack the airfield. The plan of attack he approved sent a 1,000-man force with over 100 armored vehicles crashing into the flank of a friendly unit.
Lieutenant Colonel Daly commanded that squadron (3rd Squadron) that assaulted the Umm Hajul airfield. His actions only compouned the mistakes made by Colonel Starr. If he had any knowledge that we were operating close to another friendly unit, he did not share this with his subordinate commanders. He told us that the airfield was occupied by a battalion of dug-in Iraqi infantry supported by surface laid mines. He said to "expect stiff resistance." Months after the incident, I discovered that a helicopter reconnaissance conducted by the regiment reported the airfield unoccupied. This information was relayed down to squadron level. LTC Daly did not inform his subordinates of this.
LTC Daly attacked the airfield in a squadron assult formation, with maximum firepower forward. This formation should be used only when absolutely certain of enemy location and disposition. This was not the case. The enemy situation was unclear and reconnaissance elements should have gone forward in front of the heavy armor. The squadron lead element made a navigational error and missed the airfield. My troop (I Troop) was securing the squadron's right flank, and thus encountered the airfield at or about 1 a.m. Still believing the field to be occupied by several hundred Iraqis, we mistook the small American force on the edge of the airfield to be Iraqi soldiers. A detailed synopsis of the events that followed is at Enclosure 1.
A cease fire was already in effect when LTC Daly arrived at the airfield. I had given the command several times and my second-in-command had relayed the order to the squadron command post on the radio frequency monitored by LTC Daly. I had been puzzled by a lack of fire from the small force opposing us after they fired a few shots in our direction. I thus ordered a cease fire until I could discover more about our opponents. LTC Daly charged into the area and fired the killing burst. He was not apprised of the situation, nor did he ask for an appraisal. Furthermore, had the opposing force been Iraqis, I still do not feel shooting at them was justified at that point in time. They were not firing back at us and they had no chance to escape the armored vehicles arrayed against them.
During his headlong rush to the scene, LTC Daly almost caused another friendly fire incident. An eight-wheeled German-built reconnaissance vehicle accompanied Daly's command group. In violation of basic tactical principles, LTC Daly did not announce his arrival over either the squadron or troop radio frequencies. This omission was especially critical because the reconnaissance vehicle closely resembled a Russian-built BTR-60 used by the Iraqi forces. One of the tanks in my troop believed the vehicle to be part of an Iraqi counterattack force, and requested permission from his platoon leader to shoot it. If the platoon sergeant (SFC Bobby Martin) had not recognized the minute structural differences in his thermal sight and ordered his platoon to hold their fire, the crew of three in the friendly vehicle would have died. 1LT Martinez, the tank platoon leader, announced the presence of the vehicle, the location, and direction of travel. LTC Daly should have done this prior to entering the troop perimeter.
Before LTC Daly fired the burst that killed Corporal Fielder, I observed two figures rushing towards the rear of one of my unit's M3A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles. I had given explicit orders for all individuals to remain on their vehicles. I called to all my platoon leaders to ask if they had dismounted any soldiers. All replies were negative. The only persons on the ground, to my knowledge, were enemy. I radioed a warning to the vehicle the figures were approaching and placed my machine gun sight on them. As I switched to higher magnification, I saw the outline of American Kevlar helmets on the figures. I gave an order over the troop radio frequency to maintain the "hold fire" status, and then demanded to know who the figures were. One of my scout platoon leaders answered that he thought they might have come the squadron commander's (LTC Daly) vehicle. The Bradley they had approached confirmed this report after the scouts in it confronted the figures at gunpoint. LTC Daly's blatant disregard for proper, common sense procedures once again almost resulted in the death of friendly soldiers.
I feel very strongly that LTC Daly's place was not at the front line playing tank commander. He had a force of over one hundred armored vehicles under his commande. Three quarters of them remained idle while he charged forward to grab the glory. His job was to command the squadron, not fire a machine gun. The three other maneuver units under his control halted and waited for instructions. These instructions never came. If we had been facing a determined foe, a counterattack at this point would have been devastating. It was several hours before LTC Daly again concerned himself with the rest of his unit.
LTC Ralph Hales of the 1st Infantry Division was relieved for firing missiles from his helicopter at suspected hostile vehicles several miles away on 16 February 1991. Conversely, LTC Daly killed a clearly defenseless soldier at a distance of a few hundred feet and remained in command.
Captain David Jaquot, an army lawyer, conducted an investigation of the incident immediately afterwards. he determined that there was no negligence on the part of any persons involved. Lieutenant General Frederick Franks, the VII Corps Commander, asked that the investigation be re-opened in April 1991 to resolve some unanswered questions. Captain Jaquot conducted the second investigation, which resulted in the same findings. I submit that a captain possessed insufficient rank to investigate the actions of a colonel and lieutenant colonel. Although I requested copies of both these investigations, I never received them.
I gave up command of I Troop (as scheduled) on 12 June 1991. I had been accepted for graduate school at the University of Indiana in the area of Western European Studies. Following that, I was to attend the Defense Foreign Language Institute to study French. I would then be stationed in Brussels, Belgium to attend the Belgian Command and General Staff College. All of the above would prepare me for duty as a Foreign Area Officer. I had been working towards this goal for over eight years. I am fluent in written and spoken German (native) and conversant in spoken Dutch. I also received the highest score (152) on the Defense Language Aptitude Test in the history of Fort Bliss. I qualify for any language training the military offers. This, coupled with my experience, educational background, and in-depth knowledge of the German culture makes me singularly well qualified as a Western European Foreign Area Officer.
Shortly after I left command, my follow-on schooling was abruptly canceled. I discovered that Colonel Starr had given me the worst efficiency report out of 45 captains that he evaluated. Starr never counseled me for any substandard behavior whatsoever, nor did he choose to tell me of the poor evaluation that he gave me. He simply wrote the report and submitted it without telling me of its content. I feel this evaluation is totally unjustified.
I successfully commanded the squadron's lead unit in almost every operation, and led the regiment's 200 kilometer movement into the neutral zone between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. My unit was the only one in the squadron to see combat, suffering only three lightly wounded casualties and no deaths. Both the squadron commander, LTC Daly, and the squadron operations officer, MAJ William Martin, told me that they were counting on me to lead the way for the squadron during Operation Desert Storm. This is not the performance of a substandard commander. Conversely, the troop commander who brought up the rear during every operation, failed to deploy his unit during an alert in Saudi Arabia, and personally became lost during several maneuvers received one of COL Starr's and LTC Daly's highest evaluations.
I asked LTC Daly what I could do about this injustice. He told me that it was a personality conflict and not to make an issue out of it. He said that such things happens sometimes and that I should consider the needs of the Army instead of my own. He also told me to keep quiet about it. I later discovered that LTC Daly's portion of my efficiency report had damned my by omission. It left out several key phrases that made it sub-standard when compared to the usual inflated officer efficiency reports. Appealing such a report on a substantive basis, according to the guidelines of Army Regulation 623-105, is virtually impossible (See Enclosure 2). My attempts to obtain statements from members of the 3rd Squadron have been difficult. Most of LTC Daly's subordinates are terrified that he will take retribution against them if they speak out on my behalf.
COL Starr has since been forced to retire because of an adulterous relationship with his secretary, a female enlisted soldier. He relieved a non-married officer under his command for alleged adultery with a civilian woman separated from her husband. He was committing a greater wrong while he did this. I feel that a person of his moral character should not be permitted to judge or evaluate anyone. Although COL Starr is a West Point graduate, he apparently did not embrace the ideals of that institution. I am a graduate of West Point and I find his actions reprehensible.
In October 1991, I discovered that the Army had lied to CPL Fielder's family about his death, stating that he had been killed by Iraqi fire. I journalist from the Washington Post made me aware of this. I told this journalist what I knew of the incident. His article appeared in the October 20, 1991 issue of the Washington Post (See Enclosure 3) and let to a third investigation surrounding CPL Fielder's death. Brigadier General Fred N. Halley, Corps Artillery Commander for the XVIII Airborne Corps, conducted this investigation. It concluded on 6 December 1991, but the results have not been released yet. I provided BG Halley with a copy of the document at Enclosure 1.
In December 1991, I finally received copies of the two previous investigations from Mrs. Debbie Shelton, CPL Fielder's mother. COL Starr's and LTC Daly's statements conflict in several areas. Which one of them lied? Furthermore, both of them often responded to questions they were asked with "I do not remember" or "I do not recall." Field grade officers charged with the lives of thousands of soldier should possess better mental faculties than that.
LTC Daly is a member of a very powerful military family. He is a fifth generation West Point graduate and has had general officers in his family since the Civil War. Furthermore, he is the son-in-law of General Creighton Abrams. Two of his brothers-in-law are currently general officers. I am very concerned that LTC Daly's role in this incident is being covered up as a result of his considerable clout in the military.
I feel certain that COL Starr and LTC Daly sacrificed me in an attempt to save their own careers. I cannot prove this, but then again, such actions are rarely documented. I no longer wish to make a career of the Army. I have made too many powerful enemies by speaking up during final investigation. Unfortunately, integrity is not a quality that superiors look for in officers who serve under them in today's army. I do feel however, that our government should be aware of the incompetence and possible conspiracy surrounding this incident. If COL Starr and LTC Daly had been more concerned with performing their assigned duties instead of seeking glory, medals, and recognition, Corporal Douglas "Lance" Fielder would still be alive today.
Very Respectfully,
B. H. Friesen
Captain, U.S. Army